CSIRO's Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) includes a high containment facility to safely fulfil its major role of diagnosing potentially lethal outbreaks of exotic (foreign) animal disease.
AAHL is a major facility of CSIRO Livestock Industries. It is the only laboratory in Australia where exotic animal diseases agents can be handled safely. This high containment facility is a crucial part of the protection strategy for Australia's animal exports.
Exotic disease agents are used in:
Many of these exotic diseases pose major economic threats to the nation’s animal industries, so they must be kept securely and handled safely inside the laboratory.
Procedures and containment facilities at AAHL conform with or exceed the requirements defined in the Australian/New Zealand Standard, Safety in Laboratories, Part 3; Microbiological safety and containment facilities.
The essentials for a safe biocontainment facility are:
AAHL has an international reputation for excellence in this area. The high biocontainment laboratories and animal facilities allow safe work up to the highest level (Biosecurity level 4).
Fundamentals aspects of a high containment facility include:
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a microbiologically secure 'box'
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primary containment devices such as biosafety cabinets
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documented safety procedures
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staff training.
A secure box
Diagram showing the ‘secure’ area at CSIRO's Australian Animal Health Laboratory
AAHL’s main building has four levels inside the microbiologically secure barrier. A thick concrete wall forms an airtight ‘box’ around the secure area.
All of this area is held at a lower air pressure than the outside world, to keep any airborne infectious agent inside the laboratory.
Nothing that goes into the secure area can come out without being treated: even the researchers’ notes must be faxed or emailed out.
Within the secure box are a series of smaller secure boxes, each with a drop in air pressure.
A guiding principle in the design of AAHL was that biocontainment should never be by a single barrier. If one containment system or barrier fails, then at least one other barrier is in place to protect Australia’s livestock.
Other safety provisions
All physical containment systems are duplicated, and all essential systems, such as electricity generators, steam and compressed air plants, are triplicated. For example, biocontainment would not be at risk from a computer or power failure.
Most things never leave the secure area, but those that do must first be treated. The air leaving the building is routinely filtered to remove infectious aerosols. All sewage is heat-treated and solid waste is incinerated.
Equipment leaving the secure area is sterilised by autoclave or gas decontamination. Information must be transmitted to the outside by fax or computer network, as books and papers cannot be removed once inside the secure area.
Primary containment barriers – the human factor
Special biocontainment cabinets are used for laboratory bench work when working with:
- infected animals that may be excreting viruses potentially fatal to humans. Staff work in whole-body plastic suits that isolate them from the disease hazard.
- agents such as Newcastle disease virus, which can be carried in the respiratory tract or the eyes. Staff wear breathing-air hoods.
Access to potentially dangerous agents is strictly limited to trained staff who use a range of measures to contain the disease agents.
The personal containment procedures are backed up by compulsory showering out of infected animal rooms and out of the secure area. Once outside the secure area, staff must not have contact with livestock animals for seven days.
A quarantine suite is maintained on site in the event of a laboratory accident that exposes a staff member to an exotic infectious agent. Staff would stay on site in the quarantine suite until cleared to leave.
Read more about the Australian Animal Health Laboratory.
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